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This study investigates the quantitative value of advice added by financial advisors 
in South Africa; where value is measured through return differentials between 
advised and non-advised investors. A sample of 3189 individual investors from a large 
South African investment manager was analysed over a period of approximately five 
years, from 4 August 2014 to 31 July 2019. 
The primary focus of this study is to determine whether financial advisors create 
value for investors relative to the cost of advice, by investigating if a significant 
difference exists between the net of advisor fee returns earned by advised and non-
advised investors. It also examines investor trading behaviour and assesses if any 
significant correlations exist between the number of trades made and returns earned. 
Current South African literature has a limited consideration of the cost of advice 
when considering the overall value added by financial advisors and has been found to 
consider a limited range of investment funds and asset classes. 
This study examines a range of ten investment funds that cover a range of asset 
classes and examines investment performance both before and after advice fees. The 
data is also analysed to examine the trading behaviour differences with the 
correlation between trading and investment returns also examined. 
The results of this study show that overall, the returns generated by non-advised 
investors are not significantly different from the returns generated by advised 
investors before advisor fees are considered.  
When advisor fees are considered, the impact of advisor fees creates a significant 
difference in performance between advised and non-advised investors; leading to non-
advised investors performing the same or better after fees are considered.  
The trading behaviour showed that advised investors made statistically significantly 




return differentials arising from the timing of trade decisions, for either advised or 
non-advised investors. 
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Individual investors in South Africa must navigate many decisions and choices when 
attempting to save and invest for their future. Complex decisions regarding 
investment vehicle options, risk-reward trade-offs, fund manager selection, fees and 
tax amongst others must be made. Many individuals are not adequately equipped to 
make these decisions and generally seek the guidance of a financial advisor. 
Financial advisors are required to meet regulatory requirements before they can give 
advice. Aside from this, advisors have different levels of qualifications and experience, 
and offer different levels of advice. Some offer basic advice on investment fund 
selection while others offer their clients an in-depth financial assessment typically 
known as a ‘full needs analysis’. Some advisors lack independence as they are 
representatives of product providers and are incentivised to sell investment products 
of the provider that they are tied to; while others are not tied to a single product 
provider and are deemed more independent. 
The primary focus of this study is to determine whether financial advisors create 
value for investors relative to the cost of advice. Value in this study has a very 
narrow focus by only considering quantitative value, measured through return 
differentials between advised and non-advised investors. This study also analyses the 
trading behaviour of investors to assess whether trading behaviour contributes to the 
differences in returns earned by advised and non-advised investors. 
Data containing a sample of 3189 individual investors from a large South African 
investment manager is assessed and covers a period of approximately five years. The 
sample contains investors that are both advised and non-advised, and are invested 
across ten investment funds that cover a range of asset classes. 
An analysis of the relevant literature in the next section explores the factors that 




information and choice-overload. It also explores the value of financial advice and 




2. Literature Review 
The literature review explores the value added by financial advisors on investor 
returns. Prior literature covering the value of financial advice is discussed. Factors 
such as financial literacy, behavioural biases, information and choice over-load and 
conflicts of interest are also reviewed. These areas were explored in order to gain an 
understanding of the challenges and opportunities faced by investors. 
2.1 Study by Allie, West & Willows 
The study “The value of financial advice” by Allie, West and Willows (2015) 
investigated the value added by financial advisors on the investment performance of 
advised and non-advised investors in South Africa. A sample of 4142 investors 
invested in a single equity fund was analysed over a period of 10 years, from January 
2005 to December 2014. The analysis was carried out on returns and trading 
behaviour. 
The results showed that there was no statistical difference between the returns 
generated between advised and non-advised investors. Advised investors were also 
found to trade significantly more than non-advised investors. “Increased trading 
activity by advised investors might be a function of the financial advisor’s need to be 
seen to be active, or of the financial advisor’s need to rebalance his/her client’s 
portfolio of investments. However, trading activity was found to be negatively 
correlated with performance, and neither advised nor non-advised investors matched 
or outperformed the underlying fund’s performance by their trading activity” (Allie, 
West & Willows, 2015). 
The study by Allie, West and Willows (2015) had a narrow focus on one asset class 
(equity) and did not consider the fees charged by financial advisors; however, both 




2.2 The value of financial advice 
A study by Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2011) reviewed investor data from 
both a large German brokerage and a major bank to obtain a perspective on the role 
of financial advice on individual portfolio performance. From the brokerage, 32751 
individual customers were randomly selected, while 4447 clients of a German branch-
based commercial bank were selected. Both datasets covered 34 months, from 
January 2003 to October 2005. The study found that “advisors are matched with 
richer, older, more experienced, self-employed, female investors rather than with 
poorer, younger, inexperienced and male ones” (Hackethal, Haliassos & Jappelli, 
2011:510). It also found that, in both datasets, “advised accounts offer on average 
lower net returns and inferior risk-return tradeoffs (Sharpe ratios). Trading costs 
contribute to outcomes, as advised accounts feature higher turnover, consistent with 
commissions being the main source of advisor income” (Hackethal, Haliassos & 
Jappelli, 2011:509). 
In their paper presented at the Actuarial Society of South Africa Convention, 
Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) presented a framework to provide context for 
advice and its value, described by four extreme positions. The first and most 
desirable position outlined is one where a full needs analysis is performed by an 
advisor to cater for the investor’s full financial needs. In addition, this advice should 
be positive in value even after the cost of the advice. The fourth position is the case 
where advisors generate positive value that is less than the cost of advice, “on a net 
basis the consumer’s financial well-being is negatively impacted” (Dutkiewicz, Levin 
& Dukhi, 2007). Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) suggest that lowering the cost 
of advice would be one way of shifting the experience back to a positive value.  
Position two represents an investor that does not receive advice but still has some 
level of financial literacy that enables them to generate positive value by themselves. 
Position three represents an investor experience without receiving advice and where 




no action with respect to their financial affairs, and this harms their financial well-
being” (Dutkiewicz, Levin & Dukhi, 2007). 
Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) highlight the difficulty involved in defining 
advice as value adding or not, and therefore have defined measures of value that 
could each have a positive or negative value at different points in time. These 
measures include Real Value and is defined as the financial impact on the consumer 
in real monetary terms, with Net Real Value Added being the value added after the 
cost of the advice. Perceived Value extends the concept of Real Value by also 
considering qualitative characteristics of the consumer, such as their perceptions, 
behaviour and the nature of the accumulated funds. 
Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) outline the costs entailed to run a typical 
independent advice practice. They consider the numerous activities, administrative 
and compliance duties required by Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
(FAIS) Act. They conclude that “the financial advice industry is not excessively well 
remunerated. The salaries and hourly costs suggest a market-related income given 
the level of qualifications now required by advisers under the FAIS Act” (Dutkiewicz, 
Levin & Dukhi, 2007). 
Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) conclude their paper by highlighting that while 
consumers should be wary of excessive costs that can erode savings, they should not 
avoid investment advice and investing because of this; instead, a balanced approach 
should be taken. “While costs are clearly very important, merely comparing values 
with and without costs and highlighting the reduction in maturity value as a result 
of costs, can be misleading as it does not take account of the value of the advice” 





2.3 Financial literacy 
A study by Cole and Shastry (2008) examined census data in the United States to 
assess the effects of education on financial market participation, as measured by 
investment income generated by participants. They found that “education 
significantly increases investment income” (Cole & Shastry, 2008). More specifically, 
it was found that the increase in cognitive ability through education is what 
increases market participation and not financial literacy education.  
Willis (2008) finds at least four intractable barriers that keep financial education 
from being an effective tool consumers can use to make financially enhancing 
decisions.  
First is the “informational asymmetry between sellers and consumers created by the 
complexity of financial products and the speed with which they change” (Willis, 
2008). Teaching material may be outdated by the time it is used and perhaps even 
misleading, as providers may have updated their product offerings to stay 
competitive. This also “affects the government's ability to regulate these financial 
products substantively, as well as its ability to understand the products well enough 
to educate people about them” (Willis, 2008). Any ‘rules of thumb’ or ‘conventional 
wisdom’ may also become outdated or misleading if products have adapted to 
changes in regulation.  
Secondly, consumers lack the knowledge, comprehension and numerical skills to make 
financial decisions that leave them better off (Willis, 2008). The challenge of 
understanding industry acronyms and jargon is compounded further if consumers 
lack basic skills in mathematics or the ability to read comprehensively. This 
compromises the consumers’ ability to extract information and assess which course of 
action will leave them better off. “Probabilities are another area, however, in which 
most people have poor arithmetic intuitions. Consumers must acquire not only the 




them at once” (Willis, 2008). Willis (2011) has also argued that financial education 
campaigns would need to be tailored to a specific audience to be effective, as advice 
applicable to some will not be applicable to all. This would be very costly and 
impractical. 
Thirdly, “Psychologists and behavioral economists have catalogued a host of "biases" 
apart from skill or information deficits that can interfere with decision making” 
(Willis, 2008). Lastly, there are a variety of costs associated with providing financial-
literacy education. These include costs in time, expense and the inefficient use of 
labour (Willis, 2008).  
“Even if every consumer could become her own expert financial advisor, providing 
free financial advisors would be far less expensive. Human-capital resources are most 
efficiently used when, to some optimal degree, people perform those tasks for which 





2.4 Behavioural biases 
This discussion focusses on the behavioural biases that include emotional and 
cognitive biases individuals are faced with in the context of financial or investment 
decision making. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found empirical evidence that people had an 
irrational tendency to be less willing to gamble with gains than with losses. For the 
group in their study, the loss in value from a loss was more than the gain in value 
from the same size monetary gain. Losses had more emotional impact than the same 
amount of gains. This formed the basis of their alternative model for decision making 
under risk, called prospect theory. It suggests that people are risk-averse when facing 
gains and risk-seeking when facing losses, relative to a reference point. It attempts to 
explain why people make asymmetric choices when faced with similar possible gains 
and losses, relative to a reference point. Prospect theory “helps explain how loss 
aversion and an inability to ignore sunk costs lead people to act in ways that are not 
in their best interest. The sting of losing money, for example, often leads investors to 
pull out of the stock market unwisely when prices dip” (Belsky & Gilovich, 2010). 
“The experience of conflict is the price one pays for the freedom to choose” (Tversky 
& Shafir, 1992). Tversky and Shafir (1992) found that the conflict or pain one 
experiences when faced with making a choice arises when there are many (attractive) 
options available and one does not know how to make a trade-off based on costs 
versus benefits or risk versus value. In the face of this conflict, studies showed that 
individuals are more likely to defer choice, seek new alternatives or choose the 
default option. This is further complicated by the presence of uncertainty about the 
consequences of one’s actions, along with the anticipation of conflict and regret. 
“In choosing among alternatives individuals display a bias towards sticking with the 
status quo” (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) 




status quo. People tend to be biased towards doing nothing or maintaining their 
current or previous decision and therefore decide or judge in a way that keeps things 
the same. This bias was labelled the status quo bias. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) describe the disposition effect as the tendency of 
investors to sell winners too early and ride losers too long. Investors are unwilling to 
face the bad news of losing stocks and hold on to them causing the disposition effect. 
They used four elements in their behavioural model to study this effect: prospect 
theory, mental accounting, regret aversion and self-control.  
“Prospect theory predicts a disposition to sell winners and ride losers when the 
proceeds realized are held, as opposed to being rolled over into another gamble” 
(Shefrin & Statman, 1985). When faced with an investment position that has made a 
loss, investors were found to be risk-seeking when it comes to the gamble between 
breaking even or experiencing further losses. The result is that investors tend to hold 
on to losing positions for longer, despite poor odds of recovering losses.  
Thaler (1985) attempts to explain how the use of a mental accounting system by 
individuals or households induces them to violate simple economic principles, such as 
the interchangeability of money. It was found that decision makers showed a 
tendency to separate related events and decisions; and found it difficult to aggregate 
events into net gains or losses. Instead, they set up mental accounts and view 
individual decisions as relating to one of these accounts. They then “apply prospect 
theoretic decision rules to each account by ignoring possible interaction” (Shefrin & 
Statman, 1985).  
Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigated how risk-taking behaviour is affected by 
prior gains and losses, given that decisions are rarely made without consideration of 
past experience. They found that “under some circumstances a prior gain can 
increase subjects' willingness to accept gambles” (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). They 
labelled this the house money effect. They propose that this is because after a gain, if 




prior gain, resulting in a net gain. This then mitigates the influence of loss aversion 
and allows for risk-seeking behaviour to follow. 
In contrast, they found that decision makers that experienced prior losses were less 
willing to take on risk and instead found opportunities to break-even more attractive. 
They labelled this the break-even effect. Conversely, these decision makers did not 
integrate their losses with prior events or outcomes and increased risk aversion may 
result; unless faced with an opportunity to break-even which is then deemed 
acceptable. This finding aligns with Prospect Theory, where individuals were found 
to be risk-seeking when facing losses where the individual has an opportunity to get 
back to the original reference or break-even point.  
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) describe the self-control problem as the conflict that arises 
through the interaction between an individual’s two roles – a farsighted planner and 
a short-sighted doer. The planner desires to save for later consumption, is concerned 
with lifetime utility and seeks to complete unpleasant tasks now. In contrast, the 
doer seeks to consume now and procrastinates on unpleasant tasks. This leads to the 
conflict between short-term and long-term preferences since individuals are influenced 
by both long-term rational concerns and by more short-term emotional factors. 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) found that saving money from a monthly salary required 
much more self-control from individuals than from a lump sum or bonus payment. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1995) state that “perhaps the most robust finding in the 
psychology of judgement is that people are overconfident” and this leads them to 
overestimate the reliability of their knowledge. As a result, they also overestimate 
their abilities.  
Heath and Tversky (1991) found that people are more confident in their predictions 
in fields where they have a self-declared expertise. “Competence or expertise, 
therefore, helps people take credit when they succeed and sometimes provides 




hand, prevents people from taking credit for success and exposes them to blame in 
case of failure” (Heath & Tversky, 1991).  
Kent, Hirshleifer and Avanidhar (1998) argue that investment analysts and investors 
suffer from both overconfidence and self-attribution bias. “The psychological evidence 
indicates that people tend to credit themselves for past success, and blame external 
factors for failure” (Kent, Hirshleifer & Avanidhar, 1998). Self-attribution bias occurs 
when people attribute successful outcomes to their own skill while blaming 
unsuccessful outcomes on misfortune or bad luck. 
Barber and Odean (2001) found empirically that overconfident investors trade too 
much, and that men are more overconfident than woman. As a result, men trade 
more and perform worse than woman because they overestimate the precision of their 





2.5 Information & choice over-load 
South African retail investors have access to over 1600 different investment funds to 
invest in according to statistics published as at 31 March 2020 by the Association for 
Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA). These are provided through 
‘Collective Investment Schemes’ (CIS), previously known as ‘Unit Trusts’, and cover 
local and foreign asset classes such as equities, income, property and multi-asset. 
These funds are managed by over 280 different fund managers, each defined by their 
own brand and history. The individual funds each carry their own fee structure, 
performance benchmark and performance track record. 
Retail investors considering an investment into a South African equity CIS will have 
a bouquet of about 230 different funds to choose from, managed by about 117 
managers. One could further categorise these equity funds into seven distinct 
classifications (including an unclassified category), which distinguishes the underlying 
shares by either their market capitalisation size (market cap) or their industry sector 
– such as Financial, General, Industrial, Resources etc.  
In trying to choose a single fund or a selection of funds to invest in, the investor 
faces many options and a plethora of factors to consider. While having many funds 
to choose from may seem desirable, it sometimes leads to the decision making process 
becoming more difficult and frustrating (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000).  
A study was carried out by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) where participants were 
tasked with choosing a single chocolate from a display of 30. It was found that 
participants enjoyed having a wide selection to choose from. However, after sampling 
their chosen chocolate, participants were “dissatisfied and regretful of the choices 
they made and were subsequently considerably less likely to choose chocolates rather 
than money as compensation for their participation” (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 




the decision-making process easier, less frustrating and were more satisfied with their 
chosen chocolate despite it being less enjoyable choosing from a limited selection.  
While choosing a chocolate is trivial compared to choosing an investment fund, 
facing a choice overload may lead to a poor decision making experience or no 
decision at all. Anderson (2003) describes a path to decision avoidance arising when 
faced with making a difficult decision and “when it is unclear which option best 
meets one’s important goals, one may either anticipate regret if preferences are not 
met by his or her choice or simply choose an avoidant option (especially deferral) in 
hopes of escaping the decision, mitigating negative emotion, or later discovering a 
clearly superior option” (Anderson, 2003).  
“The stakes involved produce stress, and stress occupies mental resources, which can 
result in a failure to consider all pertinent dimensions of the decision” (Willis, 2011). 
The choice overload can lead to consumers opting for oversimplified decision 
strategies which fail to consider all dimensions of the decision (Willis, 2011). 
2.6 Conflict of interest 
“Conflicts of interest occur when individuals’ professional responsibilities diverge from 
their personal interests (or when different professional responsibilities clash)” (Cain, 
Loewenstein & Moore, 2005:1). 
A laboratory experiment conducted by Cain, Loewenstein & Moore (2005) sought to 
assess if, in the context of an expert giving advice, disclosure of an inherent conflict 
of interest was effective as a mitigating solution. “It stands to reason that knowledge 
of a conflict of interest should permit recipients of biased advice to discount that 
advice and make better subsequent decisions” (Cain, Loewenstein & Moore, 2005:3). 
The results of the experiment found that disclosure benefited the providers of 
information but not its recipients. The researchers did not believe that this result 
would hold in general but rather that it should challenge the belief that disclosure is 




Loewenstein & Moore, 2005:20). It is suggested that disclosure may be more effective 
in cases where the recipient of advice has more professional experience and therefore 
has a better idea of how the conflict of interest will affect their advisor (Cain, 
Loewenstein & Moore, 2005:20). 
2.7 Conclusion 
The areas and studies explored in the literature review have highlighted the 
challenges investors face when it comes to financial decision making. Despite having 
some financial education, Willis (2008) has highlighted the barriers that prevent this 
knowledge from being useful for investors.  
Given the vast range of investment funds to choose from in the South African 
context, Anderson (2003) found that individuals may anticipate regret or choose to 
do nothing to escape making a decision. Along with a host of behavioural biases that 
investors may be unaware of, these factors make it challenging for investors to be 
self-advised.  
While seeking the assistance of a financial advisor may overcome some of these 
challenges, it also introduces challenges of its own. Allie, West and Willows (2015) 
found no statistical difference between the returns generated between advised and 
non-advised investors. They also found that advised investors traded more than non-
advised investors and this trading activity was found to be negatively correlated with 
performance.  
Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2011) found that advised investors had on average 
lower net returns due to trading costs and that this was consistent with commissions 
being the main source of advisor income. This highlights the conflict of interest issue 
faced by investors using an advisor whose income is determined by the allocation and 




3. Data & Methodology 
This section sets out the research questions, approach, data and methodology. The 
ideas and methods used here were developed from work done by Allie, West and 
Willows (2015) which study was used as a starting point.  
Allie, West and Willows (2015) made use of a sample of data from a large South 
African investment house and examined investors in one investment fund. The 
testing method assessed gross return differences between advised and non-advised 
investors in this fund. It also considered trading behaviour by assessing the difference 
in the number of overall trades and the correlation between trades and returns. 
For this study, the approach was expanded to assess investors across ten investment 
funds. The testing method considered both gross and net of advisor fee return 
differences, between advised and non-advised investors. The trading behaviour 
analysis was expanded to consider trades in more detail and investigated different 
trade types separately. 
3.1 Research questions 
The primary focus of this study is to determine whether financial advisors create 
value for investors relative to the cost of advice. Financial advisors create value for 
investors that is both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Quantitative value 
considers investment returns, which are easily measurable. Qualitative value, 
however, is less easily measurable and considers aspects such as the financial 
planning process and protection against making poor financial decisions which are 
often driven by emotional responses. This study has a very narrow focus by only 
considering quantitative value measured through return differentials between advised 
and non-advised investors. In order to investigate this, the returns and trading 




3.1.1 Return analysis 
Investment returns can be used as a quantitative measure of whether financial advice 
adds or detracts value for investors. Here value is defined as out-performance or 
under-performance for an advised investor compared to a non-advised investor. 
While returns are not the only area that advisors can add value, it is a measurable 
and objective metric.  
This study analyses two investment return types. Returns that are net of all fees but 
gross of advisor fees – referred to as ‘gross returns’; and returns that are net of all 
fees and net of advisor fees – referred to as ‘net returns’. Advisor fees consist of all 
fees charged by the financial advisor, including initial and on-going fees that are 
either expressed as fixed monetary (ZAR) amounts or as a percentage of assets under 
advice. These fees are isolated in order to determine what the value of advice is 
relative to its cost. 
It is reasonable to expect that advised investors make decisions based on the advice 
given by their advisor, and that non-advised investors make their own investment 
decisions. If both groups of investors are invested in the same underlying fund, in the 
same fee class, over the same period (“investigation period”), then differences in 
returns achieved can only arise from the timing of trade decisions (all else being 
equal). In addition to assessing return differences between the two groups, advised 
and non-advised investors, this study also considers whether there is a difference in 
the gross returns earned by investors compared to the underlying fund return. This 
would show if investors are generating excess gross returns versus the fund by the 
timing of their trades. 
This study considers the investment horizon that investors have access to by 





The following questions arise from the return analysis: 
1. Is there a difference in the gross returns earned by advised and non-advised 
investors, over the investigation period? 
2. Is there a difference in the gross returns earned by advised investors compared to 
the fund return, as well as non-advised investors compared to the fund return, 
over the investigation period? 
The answers to these two questions help explain the drivers for the answer to the 
primary question: 
3. Is there a difference between the net of advisor fee returns earned by advised and 
non-advised investors, over the investigation period? 
3.1.2 Trading behaviour analysis 
If the return differentials (before advice fees) between advised and non-advised 
investors can arise from the timing of trade decisions (all else being equal), further 
analysis on trading behaviour could explain how the return differences are generated.  
The following questions arise from the trading behaviour analysis: 
4. Is there a difference between the number of trades made by advised and non-
advised investors, over the investigation period? 
5. Is there a correlation between the number of trades made and the gross returns 





3.2 Research approach & data 
3.2.1 Acquiring data 
The data was requested and obtained from one of South Africa’s largest investment 
managers (“data provider”), making use of a data sharing agreement to protect the 
privacy and data security of all parties. The data provided was scrubbed of all 
personal identifiers. The data provider offers investors a range of investment funds to 
suit various risks profiles and return objectives. 
The data request consisted of two datasets, one consisting of transaction/trade data 
and the other market value data. The data was detailed enough to calculate returns 
for each investor, as well as to analyse the trading behaviour. The data request 
covered a period of approximately five years, from 4 August 2014 to 31 July 2019 
(the “investigation period”). The initial dataset included investor funds invested in 
local and foreign asset classes, such as equity, multi-asset, income and property.  
The transaction dataset contained details of each investor transaction, such as 
transaction amount, transaction date, transaction type (to distinguish purchase and 
redemption trades), transaction detail (describing what the transaction was for), fund 
name, etc. The market value dataset contained investor market values at a fund 
level, at the start and end of the investigation period. It also included the investor 
type, product type and an indicator showing whether the investor was advised or 
not. For both datasets, each data item was linked to a unique investor via an 
investor reference number. These reference numbers were randomly generated by the 
data provider, to ensure that no personal information was disclosed. 
Investors whose advisor indicator changed at any time during the period (i.e. non-
advised to advised or vice versa) were excluded from the dataset as per the data 
request to data provider. The initial dataset contained 5745 unique investor 





3.2.2 Data processing 
3.2.2.1 Refining initial datasets 
The initial dataset was then filtered to make it suitable for answering the research 
questions. Data integrity checks were performed to assess the quality of the data and 
to identify any errors. 
This study attempts to isolate human behaviour through the decisions of investors 
with or without the advice of an advisor. Therefore the ‘investor type’ field in the 
initial dataset was used to exclude all corporate or juristic investors so that only 
individual investors remained. 
The initial dataset included all investors that either had a fund market value greater 
than zero at the start of the investigation period or made a new investment in a fund 
sometime during the investigation period. In order to ensure comparability of the 
calculated results across investors, investors that were not invested throughout the 
investigation period were excluded. Investors were only included in the revised 
dataset if they had a non-zero market value at both the start and end of the 
investigation period. As a result, existing investors that redeemed all of their funds 
during the investigation period or made new investments made into funds during the 
investigation period were excluded from the revised dataset.   
The type of investment vehicle or product attracts a specific set of financial advice 
and trading pattern. For example, a living annuity product will require advice 
around a drawdown rate (subject to applicable legislation) and would consequently 
have an associated trading pattern. To ensure comparability of trading behaviour 
between investors, only unit trust investments were considered, and consequently the 
‘product type’ field was used to exclude all other investment types from the revised 
dataset. 
The above data exclusions and revisions reduced the initial dataset to 3714 unique 




investors – a ratio of approximately 1 non-advised investor for every 2 advised 
investors.  
3.2.2.2 Calculating investor returns 
The revised dataset was used to calculate the internal rate of return for each 
investor, both gross and net of advisor fees. All investor cash flows or trades were 
accounted for when calculating returns. The XIRR function in Microsoft Excel 
(where XIRR stands for ‘extended internal rate of return’) was used to calculate the 
internal rate of return; since it is able to use non-periodic cash flow values. Cash 
flows are non-periodic because investors in unit trust investments can make purchase 
trades (to invest) or redemption trades (to withdraw) at any given time. The XIRR 
function makes use of an iterative technique for calculating the internal rate of 
return, by using a changing rate and starting with a guess. The function cycles 
though the calculation until the return is accurate within 0.000001 percent. If no 
result is found after 100 attempts, an error value is returned. An example of how the 
XIRR was used is included in Appendix 1. 
A count of the investors in the revised dataset was split between advised and non-
advised and then further split by fund and fund class. As a result, the number of 
investors were sparsely spread across certain funds when compared to others. Funds 
with less than 20 advised or non-advised investors were excluded, leaving only 10 
unique fund type and fee class combinations in the final dataset.  
The calculated investor returns for these funds were reviewed on an investor basis to 
identify any outliers or anomalies. A high-level estimate of each investor return was 
calculated using the opening and closing market values, total purchase and total 
redemption amounts, assuming cashflows occurred halfway through the period. Each 
calculated internal rate of return was assessed for reasonability by comparing it to 
the high-level return estimate. Where the differences were large, a further 
investigation was done to assess the reasonability of the market values and 




missing, leading to an irregular return, this investor fund was excluded as an outlier 
or anomaly.   
3.2.2.3 Underlying investment funds 
The final sample contained 3189 unique investor investment funds, comprising of 
1005 non-advised and 2184 advised investors. Table 1 shows the split of these 
investor funds by asset class and fund type.  
Table 1 The number of unique investors, categorised by advice status and fund type 
  Number of investors 
Asset Class Fund Name Non-Advised Advised Total 
Equity Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 159 278 437 
Equity Equity Growth Fund 190 127 317 
Global Equity Global Equity Long Only Fund 21 95 116 
Income Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 102 172 274 
Income Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 60 132 192 
Multi-Asset Multi Asset High Equity Fund 127 226 353 
Multi-Asset Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 32 241 273 
Multi-Asset Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 207 753 960 
Multi-Asset Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 40 104 144 
Property Local Index Property Fund 67 56 123 
  Total 1005 2184 3189 
In the final dataset, the number of investors in funds Global Equity Long, Money 
Market (fee class 2), Multi Asset Low Volatility Income, Multi Asset Low Equity (fee 
class 2) and Local Index Property are fewer relative to the remaining funds. The 
ratio of advised to non-advised investors varies across funds but is on average just 
less than a ratio of 3 to 1 on a fund level. Both the absolute sample size and the 
relative size disparity between advised and non-advised investors has been recognised 
and allowed for in this study (see 3.3.3). 
The funds included in the final dataset, shown in Table 1, cover a range of asset 
classes. For both the Money Market and Multi Asset Low Equity funds, the sample 
includes two different fee classes for each fund. The fee class applies different annual 




than fee class 1. The different fee classes do not affect the results of this study as it is 
allowed for by performing the analysis on returns that are net of all fees except 
advisor fees. The underlying asset allocation for each fund is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Asset allocation of the underlying funds as at 31 July 2019 
 
(‘SA’ stands for South African) 
The data provider has designated each fund with a risk rating. The Equity, Global 
Equity and Property funds are considered high-risk funds, suited to investors with a 
higher risk tolerance. The Multi-Asset funds are considered medium-risk, except for 
the Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund which is considered low-to-medium-risk. 
The Money Market funds being fully invested in cash are considered low-risk. The 
risk rating given to a fund is driven by the asset allocation of the fund as well as the 
variability and volatility of returns historically experienced by the underlying asset 
classes. The higher the risk rating, the higher the variability and volatility of the 
fund’s expected return. 
The averages of the gross and net of advisor fee returns per fund, for both advised 
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Table 2 Annualised fund and investor returns, gross and net of advisor fees, 
categorised by advice status and fund type 
 Fund 
return 








Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 3.90% 3.84% 3.64% 3.84% 3.10% 
Equity Growth Fund 4.30% 4.31% 4.68% 4.31% 4.17% 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 10.10% 10.12% 10.69% 10.12% 10.58% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 7.00% 6.31% 6.21% 6.31% 6.21% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 7.20% 6.92% 6.73% 6.92% 6.68% 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 6.00% 5.76% 6.06% 5.76% 5.52% 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 7.00% 5.44% 6.32% 5.44% 5.98% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 5.20% 5.15% 5.12% 5.15% 4.56% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 5.50% 5.63% 5.47% 5.63% 4.95% 
Local Index Property Fund 4.60% 4.40% 4.87% 4.40% 4.71% 
The returns shown are annualised over the investigation period and are net of all fees except advisor fees, where these are 
shown as gross and net respectively. 
3.2.2.4 Calculating active trades 
In order to analyse trading behaviour between investor groups, the trading patterns 
of investors need to be determined. The transaction dataset contained detailed data 
for each trade type. For this analysis, the key consideration is trades that are a result 
of an active investment decision by the investor, termed ‘active trades’. Trades that 
are regular in occurrence (whether under advice or not) such as debit order purchases 
or pre-determined regular redemptions, if counted in full would distort the count of 
active trades for either investor group; as these series of trades are not a result of 
multiple active investment decisions. Instead, it is reasonable to assume that each 
series of regular trades is initiated by one active trade or investment decision. If an 
investor had a series of monthly purchase debit orders, only the initial decision to 
initiate the debit order instruction would count as an active decision.  
An exploratory investigation into the count of trades that included trades for advisor 
fee redemptions highlighted that these trades accounted for a significant portion of 
total redemption trades for advised investors. In order to ensure comparability of 




excluded as non-advised investors do not incur these redemption trades. 
Furthermore, the trading behaviour analysis considers the relationship between 
active trades and gross of advisor fee returns, to further ensure comparability of the 
analysis between investor groups. 
Trades related to reinvestment of income or dividends, through distributions by the 
underlying funds, were excluded as they do not relate to an active decision made by 
the investor. 
In order to summarise the transaction data into a count of active trades per investor, 
all trades were counted as active trades, except for fee redemption and reinvestment 
of income or dividend trades which were excluded and regular trades which counted 
as one active investment decision. Table 3 summarises the total and average number 
of active trades per investor. 
Table 3 Number of active trades per investor, categorised by advice status and fund 
type 
 
Total number of active 
trades 
Average number of active 
trades 
Fund Name Non-Advised Advised Non-Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 460 855 2.89 3.08 
Equity Growth Fund 558 348 2.94 2.74 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 59 62 2.81 0.65 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 1 422 832 13.94 4.84 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 280 333 4.67 2.52 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 462 862 3.64 3.81 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 107 1 239 3.34 5.14 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 673 2 640 3.25 3.51 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 354 236 8.85 2.27 
Local Index Property Fund 118 65 1.76 1.16 
The total and average active trades shown include purchase and redemption trades, where each trade is related to one active 
investment decision taken by the investor, over the investigation period. 
The active trades shown in Table 3 are split between active purchase and redemption 




Table 4: Number of active purchase trades per investor, categorised by advice status 
and fund type 
 
Total number of active 
purchase trades 
Average number of active 
purchase trades 
Fund Name Non-Advised Advised Non-Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 253 569 1.59 2.05 
Equity Growth Fund 322 230 1.69 1.81 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 43 38 2.05 0.40 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 637 286 6.25 1.66 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 82 80 1.37 0.61 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 259 541 2.04 2.39 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 32 446 1.00 1.85 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 292 1 324 1.41 1.76 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 280 57 7.00 0.55 
Local Index Property Fund 68 24 1.01 0.43 
The total and average active trades shown include only purchase trades, where each trade is related to one active investment 
decision taken by the investor, over the investigation period. 
Table 5: Number of active redemption trades per investor, categorised by advice 
status and fund type 
 
Total number of active 
redemption trades 
Average number of active 
redemption trades 
Fund Name Non-Advised Advised Non-Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 207 286 1.30 1.03 
Equity Growth Fund 236 118 1.24 0.93 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 16 24 0.76 0.25 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 785 546 7.70 3.17 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 198 253 3.30 1.92 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 203 321 1.60 1.42 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 75 793 2.34 3.29 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 381 1 316 1.84 1.75 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 74 179 1.85 1.72 
Local Index Property Fund 50 41 0.75 0.73 
The total and average active trades shown include only redemption trades, where each trade is related to one active 







The data used in this study was limited in that it was only from one investment 
house, comprising only of funds managed by them. While the data covered advised 
and non-advised investors across ten funds, the results of this study cannot take into 
account the effect of advice on other funds investors may have with other investment 
houses, nor can it consider the effect of advice in respect of the reallocation of funds 
from one house to another. 
The results of this study cannot take into account the type, extent or nature of 
advice that was provided by the advisor to the investor. It also cannot account for 
the advisor’s level of experience, qualifications, skillset, independence status or 
whether any conflicts of interest exist. 
The data provider could only provide data covering a period of approximately five 
years, due to a system change in the past. Merging data from two different systems 
was considered in order to cover a longer period. However, the risk of potential data 
anomalies and errors in the combined dataset was deemed to outweigh the benefit of 
a longer investigation period. The compromise made on the investigation period 
would be offset by the in-depth consideration of the available data – by considering 
multiple funds, a detailed analysis on the trading behaviour, the consideration of 





3.3 Research method 
All statistical analysis and testing for this study were carried out using R, a language 
and environment for statistical computing and graphics. 
3.3.1 Approach for testing 
For each investor in the final dataset, summarised in Table 1, the following statistics 
have been calculated using the methodology set out in 3.2.2: 
• Gross of advisor fee return, annualised over the investigation period 
• Net of advisor fee return, annualised over the investigation period 
• Total number of active trades, number of active purchase trades and number 
of active redemption trades over the investigation period 
For each group of advised and non-advised investors, these statistical datasets are 
compared using statistical hypothesis testing in order to answer the research 
questions set out in 3.1. 
3.3.2 Testing for normality 
In order to decide on an appropriate statistical method to use for hypothesis testing 
purposes, the underlying distributions of the return and trade datasets need to be 
assessed. Only the gross return dataset was considered here as it stands to reason 
that the net return dataset will follow the same distribution.  
Parametric statistical tests are based on the assumption that the underlying data 
follows a normal or Gaussian distribution, and therefore it is essential to test the 
data for normality before considering the use of parametric tests. 
The datasets were summarised into a diagram for each fund in order to highlight the 
shape of the distribution. A visual inspection was carried out to assess for normality. 
For the trading data , a visual inspection confirms that the data does not follow a 




distribution was evident for most funds and therefore it is more subjective to assess 
normality from a visual inspection (see Appendix 3). In order to supplement the 
visual inspection, statistical tests for normality were also carried out on the return 
data. 
Two normality tests were performed, namely the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. The null hypothesis for both tests is: 
H0: The return data of the advised and non-advised returns are normally distributed 
These tests were performed for advised and non-advised investors separately, for each 
fund type. The R code that was used for to perform these tests can be found in 
Appendix 1. The results are detailed in Appendix 4. Under the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, the null hypothesis for all funds and both advised and non-advised investors was 
rejected at a 95% confidence level.  
Under the Shapiro-Wilk test, the null hypothesis was rejected at a 95% confidence 
level for all funds except for non-advised investors in the Global Equity Long Only 
Fund. For this fund, the number of non-advised investors was small with a sample of 
only 21 investors. Normality tests are a better measure in assessing normality 
compared to visual tests, but they are not without shortcomings. “For small sample 
sizes, normality tests have little power to reject the null hypothesis and therefore 
small samples most often pass normality tests” (Oztuna, Elhan & Tuccar, 2006). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the test had insufficient power given the 
small sample size. 
Overall, it is concluded that both the return and trade datasets are not normally 
distributed and as a result parametric statistical tests cannot be used. Therefore, 
non-parametric statistical tests will be used to evaluate the research questions, as 




3.3.3 Non-parametric statistical tests 
Two non-parametric statistical tests are used to test if return and trading differences 
are statistically significant between advised and non-advised investors, and are 
detailed in turn below. The R code used to perform these tests can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (also known as the Mann-Whitney U-test) has a null 
hypothesis stating that two populations have the same distribution and median. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, then there is evidence that one of the distributions is 
shifted to the right or left of the other and therefore there is evidence that the 
medians of the two populations differ. 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is used to assess whether the difference in returns 
earned by an advised investor versus a non-advised investor is statistically 
significant, i.e. to test whether the difference in returns earned is due to chance or 
not. It is also used to assess if there is a significant difference between the number of 
trades made by advised and non-advised investors. This test can be carried out on 
very small sample sizes (Smalheiser, 2011:154). It can also be used when comparing 
two unequal sample sizes.  
Spearman's Rank Correlation “rho” is used to measure the strength and direction of 
the relationship between two variables. The null hypothesis used is that there is no 
correlation between the number of active trades made and the gross return earned by 
investors. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then there is evidence that a statistically 
significant relationship exists.  
The sign of the correlation coefficient will indicate whether the relationship is 
positive or negative, i.e. whether additional trades result in an increase or decrease in 
gross returns earned by the investor. It is worth noting that correlation alone does 




The value of the correlation coefficient ignoring the sign will indicate the strength of 
the relationship, which can be characterised as follows: 
Rho correlation value (r) Strength of relationship 
r = 0 No relationship 
0 < r < 0.30 Very weak 
0.30 ≤ r < 0.50 Weak 
0.50 ≤ r < 0.70 Moderate 
0.70 ≤ r < 1 Strong 






This section sets out the results of the statistical hypothesis testing and is shown 
under the question headings detailed in 3.1. Inferences from these results will be 
considered in section 5 under Conclusion & Recommendations.  
1. Is there a difference in the gross returns earned by advised and non-advised 
investors, over the investigation period? 
Table 6 Testing of gross return differences, advised versus non-advised investors 
 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Average gross return 
Fund Name W Statistic p-value Non-Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 20764 0.2925 3.84% 3.64% 
Equity Growth Fund 10834 0.1237 4.31% 4.68% 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 969 0.8407 10.12% 10.69% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 8764 0.9899 6.31% 6.21% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 4640 0.0571 6.92% 6.73% 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 13400 0.3016 5.76% 6.06% 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 3312 0.1953 5.44% 6.32% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 79250 0.7100 5.15% 5.12% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 2015 0.7736 5.63% 5.47% 
Local Index Property Fund 1307 0.0039* 4.40% 4.87% 
The returns shown are annualised over the investigation period, are gross of advisor fees and net of all other fees. The null 
hypothesis was rejected for funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’. The bold green text indicates 
which return was higher between advised and non-advised investors. 
At a 95% confidence level, the null hypothesis is only rejected for the Local Index 
Property Fund. Therefore, there is a statistically significant difference in the gross 
returns between advised and non-advised investors in this fund. For the remaining 
funds, the null hypothesis is not rejected and therefore there is no statistically 
significant difference in the gross returns between advised and non-advised investors. 
It is noted that the p-value for the Money Market Fund (fee class 2) is close to the 
significance level of 0.05. 
For the Local Index Property Fund, Table 6 shows that advised investors 




p.a. versus 4.40% p.a. This outperformance of on average 0.47% p.a. is statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence level and is considered a value-add by the advisor. 
2. Is there a difference in the gross return earned by advised investors compared to 
the fund return, as well as non-advised investors compared to the fund return, 
over the investigation period? 
Table 7 Testing of gross return differences, advised and non-advised investors versus 
the underlying fund 











Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 58 0.6493 160 0.7991 3.90% 
Equity Growth Fund 65 0.5926 74 0.7867 4.30% 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 13 0.8182 8 0.1582 10.10% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 16 0.2459 151 0.1965 7.00% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 9 0.2443 127 0.1151 7.20% 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 45 0.6261 138 0.7085 6.00% 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 2 0.1818 177 0.4228 7.00% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 138 0.5712 250 0.5627 5.20% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 13 0.5827 69 0.5861 5.50% 
Local Index Property Fund 45 0.5752 9 0.2608 4.60% 
The returns shown are annualised over the investigation period, gross of advisor fees and net of all other fees. The null 
hypothesis was rejected for funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’. 
At a 95% confidence level, the null hypothesis is not rejected for any of the funds 
and therefore there is no statistically significant difference in the gross returns 
between advised investors and the fund, as well as between non-advised investors 
and the fund. 
This result is as expected since investor gross returns shown in Table 2 are largely in-
line with the underlying fund returns. Differences between the investor and fund 




3. Is there a difference between the net of advisor fee returns earned by advised and 
non-advised investors, over the investigation period? 
Table 8 Testing of net return differences, advised versus non-advised investors 
 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Average net return 
Fund Name W Statistic p-value Non-Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 31 042 1.9e-12* 3.84% 3.10% 
Equity Growth Fund 15 928 1.4e-06* 4.31% 4.17% 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 993 0.9770 10.12% 10.58% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 8 798 0.9685 6.31% 6.21% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 5 743 5.9e-07* 6.92% 6.68% 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 19 332 6.2e-08* 5.76% 5.52% 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 4 821 0.0215* 5.44% 5.98% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 111 762 < 2.2e-16* 5.15% 4.56% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 3 125 3.2e-06* 5.63% 4.95% 
Local Index Property Fund 2 140 0.1808 4.40% 4.71% 
The returns shown are annualised over the investigation period, are net of advisor fees and net of all other fees. 
The null hypothesis was rejected for funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’. The bold green text 
indicates which average return per annum was higher between advised vs. non-advised investors. 
At a 95% confidence level, the null hypothesis is rejected for the Equity Dividend & 
Growth, Equity Growth, Money Market Fund (fee class 2) and all Multi Asset funds, 
and therefore there is a statistically significant difference in the net returns between 
advised and non-advised investors in these funds. For the remaining funds, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected and therefore there is no statistically significant difference 
in the net returns between advised and non-advised investors. 
Table 8 shows that out of seven funds where there is a significant difference in net 
returns, advised investors significantly outperformed non-advised investors on 
average, net of advisor fees, in one fund being the Multi Asset Low Volatility Income 
Fund.  
Where in Table 6, the Local Index Property Fund was found to have a significant 
difference in gross return in favour of advised investors, the net of advisor fee return 
is no longer found to be significantly different between advised and non-advised 




To further understand the cost and value-add of using an advisor, the return 
differential is split into components, namely: 
• the return differential due to advice before fees; and  
• the cost of advice.  
These components are expressed as an annualised return percentage. The cost of 
advice reduces the return to the investor, expressed as an annualised return effective 
over the investigation period. To determine the return differential due to advice 
before advice fees, the difference between gross returns between advised and non-
advised investors is considered. To determine the cost of advice, the difference 
between the net and gross returns of advised investors is considered. 




Table 9 Return differential components showing the cost and value-add of advice 
 















(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
Fund Name Non-Advised Advised (B) - (A) Non-Advised Advised (E) - (B) 
(C) + (F) 
(E) - (D) 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 3.84% 3.64% -0.20% 3.84% 3.10% -0.53%* -0.74% 
Equity Growth Fund 4.31% 4.68% 0.36% 4.31% 4.17% -0.50%* -0.14% 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 10.12% 10.69% 0.58% 10.12% 10.58% -0.11% 0.47% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 6.31% 6.21% -0.10% 6.31% 6.21% 0.00% -0.10% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 6.92% 6.73% -0.19% 6.92% 6.68% -0.05%* -0.24% 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 5.76% 6.06% 0.30% 5.76% 5.52% -0.54%* -0.24% 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 5.44% 6.32% 0.88% 5.44% 5.98% -0.34%* 0.54% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 5.15% 5.12% -0.03% 5.15% 4.56% -0.55%* -0.58% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 5.63% 5.47% -0.16% 5.63% 4.95% -0.53%* -0.68% 
Local Index Property Fund 4.40% 4.87% 0.47%* 4.40% 4.71% -0.16% 0.31% 
The returns are annualised over the investigation period. Funds highlighted in yellow or where the values in either columns C or F are marked with a ‘*’, indicates that the difference between 
advised and non-advised returns are statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. When comparing advised and non-advised returns, the bold green text indicates which return was higher. For 




Column G in Table 9 partly answers the primary question of this study which is “do 
financial advisors create value for investors relative to the cost of advice?”. Here 
value has a narrow definition, being additional returns for the investor. Before advice 
fees are considered, advisors in this study have added value (column C) for advised 
investors in one fund, the Local Index Property Fund, where the gross return 
difference between advised and non-advised investors was found to be statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence level. Once fees are considered, advisors have 
detracted value (column G) in 6 out of 7 funds where the net return differences 
between advised and non-advised investors was found to be statistically significant at 
a 95% confidence level. Advisors added value net of fees (column G) in 1 out of 7 
funds. 
Given that none of the funds that were found to have a significant difference in net 
returns between advised and non-advised investors were also found to have a 
significant gross return difference, it stands to reason that the cost of advice (column 
F) was the component that created the significant differences in net returns between 
the two groups.  
The primary focus of this study seeks to not only understand if financial advisors 
create value for investors through additional returns relative to the cost of advice, 
but also how (if any value is created). Understanding the trading behaviour of 
advised and non-advised investors could aid the understanding of how additional 





4. Is there a difference between the number of trades made by advised and non-
advised investors, over the investigation period? 
Table 10 Testing of trade differences, advised versus non-advised investors 
 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Average number of trades 
Fund Name W Statistic p-value Non-Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 22118.0 0.9893 2.89 3.08 
Equity Growth Fund 13092.0 0.1796 2.94 2.74 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 252.0 1.9E-09* 2.81 0.65 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 7856.0 0.1408 13.94 4.84 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 3440.5 0.1270 4.67 2.52 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 13740.0 0.4954 3.64 3.81 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 4465.5 0.1394 3.34 5.14 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 75690.0 0.5129 3.25 3.51 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 1975.5 0.6274 8.85 2.27 
Local Index Property Fund 1670.5 0.2514 1.76 1.16 
The number of trades include all active purchase and redemption trades, covering the investigation period. Funds highlighted 
in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’ indicates that the difference between the number of advised and non-
advised active trades is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. When comparing the average number of advised and 
non-advised trades, the bold green text indicates which average count is higher. 
Table 10 shows that at a 95% confidence level, there is a significant difference 
between the number of active trades between advised and non-advised investors for 
the Global Equity Long Only Fund. On average, non-advised investors trade 
significantly more than advised investors. 
While the differences between active trades between advised and non-advised 
investors for funds Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 and Multi Asset Low Equity 
Fund - Fee class 2 appear large, the difference was not found to be statistically 
significant. It is beyond the scope of this study to put forward anything conclusive as 
to why this is the case. 
Table 10 considers both active purchase and redemption trades. However, by 
combining the active purchase and redemption trades, the impact of each in isolation 
is hidden. Therefore, to better understand what drives the significant difference in 
the number of active trades, the testing shown in Table 10 is repeated by considering 




Table 11 Testing of purchase trade differences, advised versus non-advised investors 
 
W ilcoxon Rank Sum Test Average Purchase Trades 
Fund Name W Statistic p-value Non-advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 22724.0 0.5960 1.59 2.05 
Equity Growth Fund 13202.0 0.1225 1.69 1.81 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 272.0 9.31e-10* 2.05 0.40 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 7959.5 0.1338 6.25 1.66 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 3275.5 0.0064* 1.37 0.61 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 13538.0 0.3415 2.04 2.39 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 3764.0 0.8018 1.00 1.85 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 74062.0 0.2151 1.41 1.76 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 1745.0 0.0604 7.00 0.55 
Local Index Property Fund 1472.5 0.0112* 1.01 0.43 
Only active purchase trades are considered, covering the investigation period. Funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-
value is marked with a ‘*’ indicates that the difference between the number of advised and non-advised active purchase 
trades is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. When comparing the average number of advised and non-advised 
active purchase trades, the bold green text indicates which average count was higher. 
Table 11 shows that at a 95% confidence level, there is a significant difference 
between the number of active purchase trades between advised and non-advised 
investors for the Global Equity Long Only, Money Market (fee class 2) and Local 
Index Property funds. In all three funds, non-advised investors made significantly 





Table 12 Testing of redemption trade differences, advised versus non-advised 
investors 
 
W ilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Average Redemption 
Trades 
Fund Name W Statistic p-value Non-advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 22576.0 0.6574 1.30  1.03  
Equity Growth Fund 12121.0 0.9314 1.24  0.93  
Global Equity Long Only Fund 791.0 2.47e-02* 0.76  0.25  
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 8346.5 0.4904 7.70  3.17  
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 3663.5 0.3812 3.30  1.92  
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 14269.0 0.9196 1.60  1.42  
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 4806.0 0.0188* 2.34  3.29  
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 79883.0 0.5455 1.84  1.75  
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 2050.0 0.8843 1.85  1.72  
Local Index Property Fund 2011.0 0.3518 0.75  0.73  
Only active redemption trades are considered, covering the investigation period. Funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-
value is marked with a ‘*’ indicates that the difference between the number of advised and non-advised active redemption 
trades is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. When comparing the number of advised and non-advised trades, 
the bold green text indicates which average count was higher. 
Table 12 shows that at a 95% confidence level, there is a significant difference 
between the number of active redemption trades between advised and non-advised 
investors for the Global Equity Long Only and Multi Asset Low Volatility Income 
funds. For the Global Equity Long Fund, non-advised investors made significantly 
more active redemption trades compared to advised investors, while the opposite was 
true for the Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund. 
The results from Table 11 and Table 12 show that for the Global Equity Long Only 
Fund, non-advised investors made both more active purchase and redemption trades 




Figure 2 provides the average percentage of the number of investors that fall into 
each ‘number of trades’ category, across all funds. The methodology used to calculate 
the number of trades in Figure 2 is consistent with that used in 3.2.2.4 in that only 
active purchase and redemption trades are considered. 
Figure 2 Average percentage of investors categorised by number of trades 
 
Figure 2 shows that on average 35% of non-advised and 43% of advised investors 
made no active trades over the investigation period (of approximately five years). On 
average, more non-advised investors have made more than four active trades 
compared to advised investors over the period.  
The results in Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12 have shown that there are significant 
differences in the number of active trades between advised and non-advised investors 
in 4 out of 10 funds. The final set of results considers how trading frequency 
translates into additional returns for investors, by testing for significant correlation 
































5. Is there a correlation between the number of trades made and the gross returns earned, by both advised and non-advised 
investors over the investigation period? 
Table 13: Testing the correlation between the number of active trades made and gross returns earned, advised versus non-advised 
investors 
 
















Fund Name Non-advised Non-advised Non-Advised Non-Advised Advised Advised Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 0.1739 0.0284* 2.89  3.84% 0.2842 1.5E-06* 3.08  3.64% 
Equity Growth Fund 0.1942 0.0072* 2.94  4.31% 0.2932 0.0008* 2.74  4.68% 
Global Equity Long Only Fund -0.3695 0.0993 2.81  10.12% 0.4291 1.4E-05* 0.65  10.69% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 -0.2213 0.0254* 13.94  6.31% -0.2475 0.0011* 4.84  6.21% 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 -0.0046 0.9722 4.67  6.92% -0.4980 1.2E-09* 2.52  6.73% 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 0.0747 0.4039 3.64  5.76% 0.2873 1.1E-05* 3.81  6.06% 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund -0.3416 0.0557 3.34  5.44% -0.2082 0.0012* 5.14  6.32% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 -0.0975 0.1621 3.25  5.15% -0.0444 0.2233 3.51  5.12% 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 0.1289 0.4279 8.85  5.63% 0.0804 0.4170 2.27  5.47% 
Local Index Property Fund -0.3210 0.0081* 1.76  4.40% 0.2098 0.1206 1.16  4.87% 
The average number of trades includes active purchase and redemption trades, covering the investigation period. Funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’ indicates that 
the correlation between the number of active trades made and the gross return earned is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. The bold green text indicates that active trades are 
positively correlated with gross returns earned, while the bold red text indicates a negative correlation. 
Scatter plots for the funds that have a significant correlation between the number of active trades made and gross return earned 




Table 13 shows that at a 95% confidence level, there is a significant correlation 
between the number of active trades made and the gross return earned for non-
advised investors in the Equity Dividend & Growth, Equity Growth, Money Market 
(fee class 1) and Local Index Property funds.  
For advised investors, a significant correlation was found in the Equity Dividend & 
Growth, Equity Growth, Global Equity Long Only, Money Market (fee classes 1 and 
2), Multi Asset High Equity and Multi Asset Low Volatility Income funds. 
The correlation coefficients shown in Table 13 for non-advised investors show a very 
weak positive correlation for both the Equity Dividend & Growth and Equity 
Growth funds. It also shows a very weak negative correlation for the Money Market 
(fee class 1) Fund and a weak negative correlation for the Local Index Property 
Fund. Given that these correlations are weak and close to zero, the relationship 
between active trades and gross returns is considered weak or non-existent. 
For advised investors, Table 13 shows very weak positive correlations for the Equity 
Dividend & Growth, Equity Growth and Multi Asset High Equity funds; and a weak 
positive correlation for the Global Equity Long Only Fund. It also shows a very weak 
negative correlation for both the Money Market (fee class 1) and Multi Asset Low 
Volatility Income funds; and a moderate negative correlation for the Money Market 
(fee class 2) Fund.  
The correlation for the Money Market (fee class 2) Fund, while only moderate, shows 
that a relationship exists where gross returns decrease with an increase in the 
number of active trades. The correlations for the remaining advised funds are close to 
zero and therefore the relationship between active trades and gross returns is 
considered weak or non-existent. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to put forward anything conclusive as to why 




The same testing is repeated separately for active purchase and redemption trades in 
order to better understand what the drivers are for the significant correlations shown 




Table 14 Testing the correlation between the number of active purchase trades made and gross returns earned, advised versus non-
advised investors 
 Spearman Rho correlation test  
 








Fund Name Non-advised Non-advised Non-advised Advised Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 0.2423 0.0021* 1.59 0.3628 4.5E-10* 2.05 
Equity Growth Fund 0.2126 0.0032* 1.69 0.3406 0.0001* 1.81 
Global Equity Long Only Fund -0.0443 0.8488 2.05 0.4292 1.4E-05* 0.40 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 0.0715 0.4754 6.25 -0.0776 0.3117 1.66 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 0.3833 0.0025* 1.37 -0.1466 0.0935 0.61 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund -0.0070 0.9375 2.04 0.2150 0.0011* 2.39 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund -0.3549 0.0463* 1.00 -0.1215 0.0597 1.85 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 -0.1200 0.0850 1.41 -0.0434 0.2347 1.76 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 -0.0904 0.5792 7.00 -0.0655 0.5089 0.55 
Local Index Property Fund -0.4871 2.9E-05* 1.01 -0.3195 0.0164* 0.43 
The average trades only include active purchase trades, covering the investigation period. Funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’ indicates that the correlation 
between the number of active purchase trades made and the gross return earned is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. The bold green text indicates that active purchase trades are 




Table 15 Testing the correlation between the number of active redemption trades made and gross returns earned, advised versus 
non-advised investors 
 
Spearman Rho correlation test  
 








Fund Name Non-advised Non-advised Non-advised Advised Advised Advised 
Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 0.1033 0.1953 1.30  0.0086 0.8865 1.03  
Equity Growth Fund -0.0717 0.3253 1.24  0.0939 0.2935 0.93  
Global Equity Long Only Fund -0.5152 0.0169* 0.76  0.1603 0.1208 0.25  
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 -0.3418 0.0004* 7.70  -0.2591 0.0006* 3.17  
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 -0.1198 0.3618 3.30  -0.5144 2.8E-10* 1.92  
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 0.1128 0.2068 1.60  0.2256 0.0006* 1.42  
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund -0.2738 0.1294 2.34  -0.2011 0.0017* 3.29  
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 0.0049 0.9442 1.84  -0.0325 0.3737 1.75  
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 0.2573 0.1090 1.85  0.1802 0.0672 1.72  
Local Index Property Fund 0.4430 0.0002* 0.75  0.6027 8.9E-07* 0.73  
The average trades only include active redemption trades, covering the investigation period. Funds highlighted in yellow or where the p-value is marked with a ‘*’ indicates that the correlation 
between the number of active redemption trades made and the gross return earned is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. The bold green text indicates that active redemption trades 




Table 14 shows that at a 95% confidence level, there is a significant correlation 
between the number of active purchase trades made and the gross returns earned for 
non-advised investors in the Equity Dividend & Growth, Equity Growth, Money 
Market (fee class 2), Multi Asset Low Volatility Income and Local Index Property 
funds. 
For advised investors, a significant correlation was found in the Equity Dividend & 
Growth, Equity Growth, Global Equity Long Only, Multi Asset High Equity and 
Local Index Property funds. 
The correlation coefficients shown in Table 14 for non-advised investors show a very 
weak positive correlation for both the Equity Dividend & Growth and Equity 
Growth funds; and a weak positive correlation for the Money Market (fee class 2) 
Fund. It also shows a weak negative correlation for the Multi Asset Low Volatility 
Income Fund and a borderline moderate negative correlation for the Local Index 
Property Fund. 
The correlation for the Local Index Property Fund, while only borderline moderate, 
shows that a relationship exists where gross returns decrease with an increase in the 
number of active purchase trades. The correlations for the remaining non-advised 
funds are close to zero and therefore the relationship between active purchase trades 
and gross returns earned is considered weak or non-existent. 
For advised investors, Table 14 shows weak positive correlations for the Equity 
Dividend & Growth Fund, Equity Growth and Global Equity Long Only funds; and 
a very weak positive correlation for the Multi Asset High Equity Fund. It also shows 
a weak negative correlation for the Local Index Property Fund. Given that the 
correlations for advised investors are weak and close to zero, the relationship between 





Table 15 shows that at a 95% confidence level, there is a significant correlation 
between the number of active redemption trades made and the gross return earned 
for non-advised investors in the Global Equity Long Only, Money Market (fee class 
1) and Local Index Property funds. 
For advised investors, a significant correlation was found in the Money Market (fee 
classes 1 and 2), Multi Asset High Equity, Multi Asset Low Volatility Income and 
Local Index Property funds. 
The correlation coefficients shown in Table 15 for non-advised investors show a weak 
positive correlation for the Local Index Property Fund. It also shows a weak negative 
correlation for the Money Market (fee class 1) and a moderate negative correlation 
for the Global Equity Long Only Fund. 
The correlation for the Global Equity Long Only Fund, while only moderate, shows 
that a relationship exists where gross returns decrease with an increase in the 
number of active redemption trades. The correlations for the remaining non-advised 
funds are close to zero and therefore the relationship between active redemption 
trades and gross returns earned is considered weak or non-existent. 
For advised investors, Table 15 shows a very weak positive correlation for the Multi 
Asset High Equity Fund; and a moderate positive correlation for Local Index 
Property Fund. It also shows very weak negative correlations for the Money Market 
(fee class 1) and Multi Asset Low Volatility Income funds; and a moderate negative 
correlation for the Money Market (fee class 2) Fund.  
The correlation for the Money Market (fee class 2) Fund, while only moderate, shows 
that a relationship exists where gross returns decrease with an increase in the 
number of active redemption trades. Likewise, for the Local Index Property Fund, 
while only moderate, the positive correlation shows that a relationship exists where 
gross returns increase with an increase in the number of active redemption trades. 




relationship between active redemption trades and gross returns earned is considered 
weak or non-existent. 
The results shown in Table 14 and Table 15 when viewed together help explain the 
drivers that cause the significant correlations shown in Table 13, at a 95% confidence 
level.  
For non-advised investors, the significant positive correlations for the Equity 
Dividend & Growth and Equity Growth funds shown in Table 13 are driven by 
significant active purchase trades.  
The significant negative correlation for the Money Market (fee class 1) Fund shown 
in Table 13 is driven by significant active redemption trades.  
For the Local Index Property Fund, both active purchase and active redemption 
trades were found to have a significant correlation with gross returns at a 95% 
confidence level, however these relationships were opposing. Active purchase trades 
had a borderline moderate negative correlation with gross returns, while active 
redemption trades had a weak positive correlation. As a result, it is not conclusive 
which type of trade is the driver for the significant correlation shown in Table 13.  
Table 14 showed a significant correlation for active purchase trades in the Money 
Market (fees class 2) and Multi Asset Low Volatility Income funds, but there were 
no significant correlations in the same funds for active redemption trades in Table 15 
or overall active trades in Table 13. Table 15 showed a significant correlation for 
active redemption trades in the Global Equity Long Only Fund, but there were no 
significant correlations in the same fund for active purchase trades in Table 14 or 
overall active trades in Table 13. In this study, it appears that when active purchase 
and redemption trades are combined and significance testing is carried out using the 
combined total active trades, the overall correlation between total active trades and 




For advised investors, the significant positive correlations for the Equity Dividend & 
Growth, Equity Growth and Global Equity Long Only funds shown in Table 13 are 
driven by significant active purchase trades.  
The significant negative correlations for the Money Market (fee classes 1 and 2) and 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income funds are driven by significant active redemption 
trades.  
For the Multi Asset High Equity Fund, both active purchase and active redemption 
trades were found to have a significant positive correlation with gross returns at a 
95% confidence level. As a result, they are both the drivers for the significant 
correlation shown in Table 13.  
Table 14 showed a significant negative correlation for active purchase trades in the 
Local Index Property Fund while Table 15 showed a significant positive correlation 
for active redemption trades. However, there is no significant correlation in the same 
fund for overall active trades in Table 13. As stated previously for non-advised 
investors, when active purchase and redemption trades are combined for advised 
investors, the overall correlation between total active trades and gross returns 




5. Conclusion & Recommendations 
5.1 Summary of results 
The results of this study show that overall, the returns generated by non-advised 
investors are not significantly different from the returns generated by advised 
investors before advisor fees are considered. These results indicate that, without 
considering advisor fees, investors performed the same whether advised or not and 
that this investment performance is not significantly different from the underlying 
fund performance. This result is consistent with the findings of Allie, West and 
Willows (2015). 
In this study, when advisor fees are considered and net of advisor fee returns are 
compared, the results show that non-advised investors outperform advised investors 
in 6 out 10 funds. Only in 1 out of 10 funds do advised investors outperform non-
advised investors. For the remaining 3 funds, there is no significant difference in net 
of advisor fee returns.  
Overall, in 4 out of 10 funds, advised investors performed the same or better than 
non-advised investors. Conversely, it could be viewed that in 9 out of 10 funds, non-
advised investors had the same or better performance than advised investors. 
The analysis carried out in this study shows that the impact of advisor fees creates 
the significant difference in performance between advised and non-advised investors; 
leading to non-advised investors performing better after fees are considered. Table 9 
highlights that in most cases, the additional returns generated by advice is 
significantly eroded by the cost of advice. This finding is consistent with the study 
by Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2011), where it was also found that advised 
investors had lower net returns on average. However, in this study, lower net returns 
is driven by the cost of advice, and not due to trading costs as a result of increased 




On investigating the drivers for return differentials between advised and non-advised 
investors, the results of this study show that overall, advised investors made fewer 
active trades than non-advised investors. Across all funds considered in this study, 
43% of advised investors made no trades over the period of investigation, compared 
to 35% of non-advised investors (Figure 2). 21% of advised investors made 4 or more 
active trades over the period of investigation, compared to 27% of non-advised 
investors (Figure 2). This result is contrary to what was found by Allie, West and 
Willows (2015), who found that advised investors traded significantly more than non-
advised investors. It may be that advisors have overcome the negative behavioural 
effect arising from overconfidence and overtrading, as discussed by Barber and 
Odean (2001). Perhaps non-advised investors have overestimated their abilities as 
discussed by De Bondt and Thaler (1995), leading them to trade more. 
When assessing the correlation of active trades made and gross returns earned, the 
results did not show strong evidence of return differentials arising from the timing of 
trade decisions, for either advised or non-advised investors. The results of this study 
show that despite non-advised investors trading more on average than advised 
investors, their investment performance is not worse off as a result. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The limitations of this study are reiterated here to highlight its relevance on the 
conclusions drawn. The data used in this study covered a period of approximately 
five years and was limited to one investment house and only considered ten funds 
managed by them. The results of this study cannot take into account the effect of 
advice on other funds investors may have with other investment houses, nor can it 
consider the effect of advice in respect of the reallocation of funds from one house to 
another. The results also cannot take into account the type, extent or nature of 
advice that was provided by the advisor to the investor. It also cannot account for 
the advisor’s level of experience, qualifications, skillset, independence status or 




This study only considers the quantitative value of advice measured through return 
differentials between advised and non-advised investors. The results of this study 
show that while advisors do add value through excess returns on investor portfolios, 
the return difference is not significant when compared to non-advised investors. The 
results also show that when the cost of advice is considered for advised investors, it 
detracts value as the additional returns added is less than the cost of advice. 
The results of this study align with the fourth quadrant of the ‘Advice-Value 
Framework’ outlined by Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) where “on a net basis 
the consumer’s financial well-being is negatively impacted” (Dutkiewicz, Levin and 
Dukhi, 2007). Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) suggest that lowering the cost of 
advice would be one way of shifting the experience back to a positive value. 
The alternative view is that the cost of advice is necessary to overcome the many 
behavioural and cognitive biases investors are faced with when making investment 
decisions, which can “interfere with decision making” (Willis, 2008). Further to this, 
Willis (2008) finds that information asymmetry between product providers and 
consumers along with the everchanging regulatory landscape, lack of consumer 
comprehension and numeracy skills puts consumers in a poor position to be self-
advised. Given that retail investors have a plethora of investment options available 
to them, this could lead to a ‘choice overload’. Willis (2011) suggests that this can 
lead to consumers opting for oversimplified decision strategies which fail to consider 
all dimensions of the decision. Anderson (2003) suggests that consumers may avoid 
making any decisions if they are unclear what the best option is or anticipate regret. 
Ultimately, there needs to be a balance between forgoing investment returns in order 
to pay for financial advice and receiving no advice at all and potentially making poor 
investment decisions or making no financial decisions at all and neglecting one’s 
financial well-being.  
While the results of this study show that financial advisors were unable to add 




through the advice process. It stands to reason that the more extensive the advice 
process followed, such as a full needs analysis approach (so that the investor’s full 
financial needs are met), and the more qualified and experienced the financial 





5.3 Areas for future research 
The data used in this study was limited to one investment house and only considered 
ten funds. Therefore, the results do not take into account the effect of advice on 
other funds, held by other investment houses. As such, it does not consider the 
investors full investment portfolio or their full investment strategy, and therefore 
does not cover the full spectrum of advice given by the advisor. Further analysis 
could be carried out on an extended data set, covering multiple funds from multiple 
investment houses. 
The analyses in this study could be extended to consider the gender and diversity of 
financial advisors to investigate if there is any gender bias present. 
This study does not consider the type or extent of advice given by the advisor to the 
investor. It also cannot account for the advisor level of experience, qualifications, 
skillset, independence status or whether any conflicts of interest exist. The analyses 
could be extended to investigate whether advisors are independent or tied to a 
specific product provider or investment house. It could also consider whether advisors 
have provided a full or partial financial needs analysis or consider other forms of 
quantifying the extent of advice. These factors could be studied to assess its impact 
on the qualitative value of advice relative to its cost. 
This study only considered the frequency and type of investor trades. The analyses 
could be extended using more granular trade data which includes the timing of daily 
trades and the daily underlying fund unit price. It would then be possible to 
investigate whether investors time their trades in relation to the underlying fund 
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7.1 Appendix 1 
Using the XIRR function in Microsoft Excel 
The XIRR function was used to calculate both the gross and net of fees returns. 
Figure 3 below shows an illustrative example of how the function is used.  
The function requires a schedule of cashflows along with corresponding dates. The 
series of cashflows must contain at least one positive cashflow and one negative 
cashflow. For this reason, the closing market value is always stated as a negative 
value. This accommodates the case where all other cash flows are positive. The 
function also makes use of a ‘guess’, whereby the user inserts a number that is 
guessed to be close to the result of the XIRR function. In this case, 0 is used, but is 
not required. The function always returns an annualised internal rate of return. 
The function in cell J3 is ‘=XIRR(D3:I3,D2:I2,0)’ 
If the cashflows, opening and closing market values are arranged in a spreadsheet 
with all the applicable dates, for all investors, the XIRR function can be used to 
calculate the annualised internal rate of return. This process would need to be 
repeated with cashflows that include fees in order to calculate the gross return. 






R code used for statistical hypothesis testing 
The following R packages are required to be installed after R is installed: 
‘timeDate’, ‘timeSeries’, ‘fBasics’, ‘lawstat’, ‘pspearman’.  
The code used for each statistical test is as follows: 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
ksnormTest(x, title = NULL, description = NULL) 
Shapiro-Wilk 
shapiroTest(x, title = NULL, description = NULL) 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (Mann-Whitney U-test) 
wilcox.test(x, y = NULL, 
            alternative = c("two.sided", "less", "greater"), 
            mu = 0, paired = FALSE, exact = NULL, correct = TRUE, 
            conf.int = FALSE, conf.level = 0.95, …) 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Rho 
cor.test(x, y, 
         alternative = c("two.sided", "less", "greater"), 
         method = c("pearson", "kendall", "spearman"), 






R code used for charts 
The R package ‘ggpubr’ was used to create the statistical charts. 
The code used for creating scatter plots is as follows: 
ggscatter( 
  data, 
  x, 
  y, 
  title = NULL, 
  xlab = NULL, 
  ylab = NULL, 
  add = "reg.line", 
  add.params = list(color = "green", fill = "lightgray"), 
  font.label = c(12, "plain"), 
  font.family = "", 
  label.select = NULL, 
  cor.coef = FALSE, 
  cor.coeff.args = list(), 
  cor.method = "spearman", 






7.2 Appendix 2 
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7.3 Appendix 3 
Histograms showing the distribution of the gross return data 






































































7.4 Appendix 4 
 Null hypothesis (H0): The return data of the advised and non-advised returns are normally distributed 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
        
Shapiro-W ilk test 
      
 






















Equity Dividend & Growth Fund 0.4631 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.4510 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.6182 < 2.2e-16 0.5156 < 2.2e-16 
Equity Growth Fund 0.4872 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.5032 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.6781 < 2.2e-16 0.8166 2.7e-11 
Global Equity Long Only Fund 0.5210 7.9e-06 3.9e-06 0.5227 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.9600 0.5166 0.5350 7.6e-16 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 1 0.5000 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.5000 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.7011 4.1e-13 0.6828 < 2.2e-16 
Money Market Fund - Fee class 2 0.5092 3.1e-14 6.2e-14 0.5000 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.6505 1.1e-10 0.4159 < 2.2e-16 
Multi Asset High Equity Fund 0.4650 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.4786 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.7256 4.2e-14 0.5984 < 2.2e-16 
Multi Asset Low Volatility Income Fund 0.4788 1.4e-07 2.9e-07 0.4779 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.6538 1.9e-07 0.6363 < 2.2e-16 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 1 0.4878 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.4783 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.7187 < 2.2e-16 0.6766 < 2.2e-16 
Multi Asset Low Equity Fund - Fee class 2 0.5103 8.9e-10 1.8e-09 0.4971 < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.7982 6.2e-06 0.7669 1.5e-11 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 5 10 15
Number of trades
G
ro
ss
 r
e
tu
rn
 %
 p
.a
.

